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Abstract  
Several studies have revealed the difficulties often found in defining stakeholders’ roles in post-disaster 
reconstruction projects. Insufficient and ill-timed collaboration are typically identified as the principal 
source of problems. Borrowing the concept of Institutional Fragmentation (IF) from the field of project 
management, this paper examines significant obstacles to collaboration and to sharing knowledge and 
experience in post-disaster reconstruction projects, revealing the causes and effects at four levels of 
fragmentation: the construction industry, project procurement, design and construction work. The case 
of the reconstruction program conducted after the 2003 earthquake in Bam (Iran), illustrates these 
different levels of fragmentation and their short and long-term impacts. Results show that three of the 
four levels of fragmentation caused unexpected outcomes during program implantation and afterwards; 
fragmentation increased the divergence between the many stakeholders with their interests and 
expectations, during and after their intervention. Conflict and confrontation between two controller 
organizations led to an excessive emphasis on technical requirements at the expense of heritage 
preservation. Results also explain how specific conditions after the disaster - such as lack of time 
coupled with socio-political pressures - increased fragmentation. Post-disaster reconstruction projects 
require systematic and comprehensive procurement to cover the interfaces that will enable tasks to be 
conducted effectively. The study proposes a conceptual approach to fragmentation that can help 
academics, practitioners, and decision-makers understand the origins and consequences of institutional 
fragmentation on the timely use of resources, and to develop governance structures and mechanisms 
that can help reduce it in post-disaster reconstruction initiatives.  
Keywords: Bam (Iran); Case histories; Institutional fragmentation; Organizational design; 
Reconstruction; Learning organizations; Time compression. 
Introduction  
Lack of collaboration and scant sharing of knowledge between participants in a supply chain exist in 
various business sectors, including manufacturing (Christensen et al., 2001), aviation (Haller et al., 
2008) and pharmaceutics (Powell, 1996). The problem is particularly acute in construction (Ofori, 
2012), and also in post-disaster reconstruction (Amaratunga et al., 2009). In this paper, we examine this 
common challenge using the lens of Institutional Fragmentation, borrowed from the field of project 
management. We focus on the case of the reconstruction of the city of Bam (Iran), after the 2003 
earthquake, to illustrate common obstacles to collaboration and to the sharing of knowledge and 
experience. The case of transitional sheltering and permanent housing reconstruction in Iran helps to 
explain stakeholders’ roles, their sequence of interventions, and the variety of expertise, knowledge and 
interests they brought. This case helps us also to reveal some unexpected consequences of the 
generalized fragmentation that prevails in post-disaster reconstruction, enabling us to address the leading 
causes and potential outcomes of insufficient collaboration and sharing the knowledge and information 
in reconstruction projects, particularly regarding the use of the limited time available.   
 
This article is divided into four sections. First, the concepts of institutional fragmentation and time 
compression in the construction sector are explained. This section also addresses critical concepts about 
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stakeholders’ roles in the construction industry and in post-disaster reconstruction. The methods section 
explains data collection and analysis strategies and tools used for the case study. The third section 
summarizes the main elements of the reconstruction experience in Bam after the 2003 earthquake and 
presents the stakeholders involved, in the order in which they intervened in the transitional sheltering 
and permanent housing reconstruction phases. The discussion section further elaborates on the 
theoretical and practical implications of the research findings and explores the unexpected outcomes of 
fragmentation and time compression, including the impacts a few years after the disaster. The last 
section summarises the main findings of the study and highlights future research avenues.   
Fragmentation in the construction sector 
Many studies have demonstrated that the construction sector is significantly affected by fragmentation 
in stakehodlers’ roles and responsibilitues. The Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA) found in 
1964 that "In the traditional organisation of building, the various interests are usually confined to their 
own compartments. Demand has been isolated from design, demand and design from the manufacture 
of components and all three from construction on site" (RIBA, 1964, p. 8). The traditional building team 
is a “temporary grouping of independent entities brought together by certain contracts […] characterized 
by its dispersion and its discontinuity" (Davidson, 1988, p. 512). More recently, Mohsini and Davidson 
(1992) found that inter-firm conflict (a consequence of fragmentation) was a contributing factor to loss 
of efficiency. Other authors reach similar conclusions. For Groák (1994, p.291) fragmentation is a 
“normal and familiar attribute of the industry”. According to him, it arises from the “intrinsic complexity 
of the building process – in terms both of techniques and of organization” and the industry has learnt to 
“cope with this fragmentation, despite the problems of interfacing that it involves" (page 346). Other 
authors have identified four types of fragmentation in the construction sector (see Table 1): 
 
• Construction industry fragmentation refers to the existence of a large number of design and 
consulting firms and contractors and enterprises that work for different (short) periods of time on 
any one project (Pries & Janszen, 1995; Rutten et al., 2009; Yates & Battersby, 2003). Numerous 
studies explain the principal reasons and possible consequences of this kind of fragmentation. Ofori 
(1992) and Alwi and Hampson (2003) argue that poor coordination among project participants leads 
to inefficiency, waste, and quality and safety problems. Gottlieb and Haugbølle (2013) point to the 
practice of competitive tendering for subcontracted work within projects - which further contributes 
to, and formalizes fragmentation. These authors also find that the high division of labor caused by 
over-specialization, and generalized subcontracting of work hinder the coordination and transfer of 
knowledge and learning from one actor to the next.  	
 
• Traditional procurement fragmentation creates confrontational relationships between parties. 
According to Ling (2003), design–bid–build contracting is a prime example of how traditional 
procurement causes fragmentation. The typical relationships in conventional procurement methods 
motivate participants to prioritize their own economic interests, seemingly regardless of whether 
their actions would hurt other project players or jeopardize the project as a whole. Forgues and 
Koskela (2009) find that traditional procurement fragmentation reinforces socio-cognitive barriers 
and hinders the team efficiency that is essential for the emergence of collaboration and innovation. 
In response, Dulaimi et al. (2002) affirm that the (less common) design-build methods enable 
companies to increase substantial collaboration and decrease the impact of contractual and statutory 
constraints. Mohsini et al. (1995), however, found that innovative procurement strategies often 
produce a counter effect, since they upset the habitual reliance on traditional knowledge about roles 
and practices. Nonetheless, current studies go so far as to suggest that “integrated design,” that 
increases the involvement of clients in the process, encourages pre-planning of design, and enables 
team members to share knowledge for continuous learning (Leoto et al., 2014).    
 
• Design project fragmentation: the involvement of different professions, accompanied by the 
increasing specialization of roles, leads to fragmentation in the design process (Brown & Duguid, 
2001). A number of studies point out the difficulties with the sequential approach to design 
development. Huovila and colleagues (1997) identify duplications and unnecessary constraints, the 
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lack of leadership and accountability, and the ensuing waste of time and resources as the main 
symptoms of fragmentation in design processes. Löhnert et al. (2003), therefore, suggest redefining 
the design process, changing it from a sequential to a collaborative one, so that it becomes possible 
to establish long-term relationships within the design team and thence stimulate value generation. In 
this vein, Katsanis and Davidson (2001) propose the pertinence of, and potential for, informal 
groupings of professionals who are used to working together and are able to call upon each other 
when appropriate openings arise; they call these "Rolodex© firms".  
 
• Construction work fragmentation occurs when the realization of a project depends on the 
participation of numerous certified trades (Lizarralde et al., 2008). For instance, more than 20 
certified professions work in the construction of a normal single-family house in Quebec, Canada 
(CCQ, 2015). Although the growth of the number of trades aims at increasing the quality of work, 
and ensuring safety and security, it formalizes fragmentation, reputedly slowing down projects, 
increasing costs and hiding the complete picture of the project, even to project participants. Although 
construction work fragmentation is common in developed countries, it can also be seen to a certain 
degree in developing ones as well (Lizarralde et al., 2008).  
 
These four types of fragmentation (which can best be described here as institutionalized fragmentation) 
lead to difficulties in managing time in construction projects (projects are often reported as being 
finished long after the expected hand-over dates). In the particular case of reconstruction projects, this 
is an acute issue, as is explained below.  
 
Table 1: Fragmentation; causes and effects (with emphasis on the effects on time compression)	
Fragmentation Causes Effects 
Construction 
industry 
fragmentation  
- Competitive tendering for 
subcontracted works (Gottlieb & 
Haugbølle, 2013). 
- Extreme specialization of functions 
and involvement of various 
professions (Kulatunga et al., 2006).  
- Poor coordination among project 
participants (Ofori, 1992).  
- Specialization leads to increased 
speed of work. 
- Large number of participants leads 
to delays. 
 
Traditional 
procurement 
fragmentation  
- The design-bid-build method of 
procurement (Ling, 2003).  
- Temporary project settings, a strong 
division of labor, separation of 
design and production, and 
competition on cost rather than on 
optimization of value (Thomassen, 
2003). 
- Isolation of contractors and 
consultants (Gann & Salter, 2000).  
- Stifled innovation and collaboration 
(Latham, 1994).   
- Reinforcement of socio-cognitive 
barriers that hinder team efficiency 
(Forgues & Koskela, 2009).  
- Confrontational relationship. 
- Separate contracts impede rapid 
decision-making and contract 
procedures take time up front 
(Mossman et al., 2010).   
Design project 
fragmentation  
- Sequential design rooted in 
professional codes of practice 
(Brown & Duguid, 2001).  
- Current trends for working in 
isolated silos, with no real 
integration of the participants’ 
collective wisdom (Lichtig, 2006).  
- Epistemic barriers, eliminating the 
results from collaborative work 
(Brown & Duguid, 2001).  
- Sub-optimal solutions.  
- Poor constructability and 
operability.    
- Rework in design and construction, 
and lack of innovation (Huovila et 
al., 1997) 
- Separation of design from 
construction inhibits         
innovation for speedier construction 
processes 
4 	
Construction work 
 fragmentation  
- The increase of certified trades in 
construction (Lizarralde et al., 
2008).   
- Increase in prices and creation of a 
vague picture of the project, 
hindering the transfer of information 
and knowledge.  
- Interfaces between trades lead to 
delays 
- Separation of manufacture from 
construction prevents time-saving 
innovation 
Stakeholders’ roles and interests in post-disaster reconstruction 
Borrowing the stakeholder definition proposed by (Freeman, 1983), stakeholders in reconstruction 
projects include persons, groups and organizations, singly or as a system, who are either likely to be 
influenced by post-disaster interventions or who may have an influence on the project, playing different 
roles and having varied responsibilities (Hidayat & Egbu, 2010; Smith, 2014). According to Davidson 
et al. (2007) and Asgary et al. (2006), stakeholders in a reconstruction process usually include 
representatives of: 1) the impacted community; 2) governments (national and local), including public 
and semi-public entities in a wide range of sectors and roles; 3) civil society organizations including 
NGOs, community groups, and voluntary associations; 4) private sector (i.e., business and industry 
groups); 5) professional groups, such as academic, training organizations, and consulting firms; and 6) 
media.  
 
The diversity of stakeholders in terms of interests, experience, and resources often causes serious 
challenges in post-disaster reconstruction projects such as: discontinuity of interventions, fragmentation 
in aid delivery, and overlapping agencies’ roles in the emergency response phase. Asgary et al. (2006), 
for instance, reveal conflicts between NGOs and explain how an international NGO with a specific focus 
on sheltering female-headed households provided inappropriate houses and excluded vulnerable 
families from aid programs after the 2003 earthquake in Bam, Iran. Similarly, Hayles (2010) notes that 
permanent housing reconstruction projects led by international aid organizations and NGOs are often 
discontinuous, and suffer from inadequate experience and limited knowledge about local conditions. In 
fact, coordination among stakeholders is necessary, and potential competition, rivalry, and 
fragmentation between them need to be considered in advance. 
The construction industry in a post-disaster context 
The work of the construction industry after disasters is different from regular conditions. Firstly, the 
recovery process does not begin with the disaster event; it “is influenced by the existing uses of space 
and political economy of an area” (Olshansky et al., 2008, p. 199), which are obviously outside the 
control of individual participants in the reconstruction program.	 The key difference is “time 
compression”, which, according to Norling (2013), refers to a compressed timeframe for the 
reconstruction of destroyed buildings and infrastructure. Olshansky et al. (2012) comment that planning 
for and implementing post disaster reconstruction has to face (i) the urgency and seriousness of the 
situation where decisions have to be made in a compressed timeframe and (ii) in a context where many 
local resources have been disrupted or destroyed. As a consequence, post-disaster reconstruction is 
likely to suffer from escalation in construction costs (Chang et al., 2010) and shortage of available 
resources (Le Masurier et al., 2006), which reduce the real value of aid funds, threatening project quality, 
and delaying the recovery processes (Bosher & Dainty, 2011; Ofori, 2002; Witt et al., 2014).  
 
Difficult relationships thus typically exist between suppliers of aid and the construction industry. Aid 
organizations often lack appropriate technical and managerial expertise and fail to analyze local 
conditions and do not work either with local construction industries (VonMeding et al., 2013), or with 
the local informal sector (Lizarralde, 2015). Furthermore, international donors - in particular - have rigid 
standards for design and construction that are often disconnected from local capacities (Lizarralde, 
2015). Also, the temporary character of the participation of humanitarian organizations hinders learning 
and sharing knowledge with construction organizations (Norling, 2013). As a consequence, the specific 
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conditions after disasters exacerbate the existing fragmentation in regular construction projects and 
generate difficult relationships between the construction industry and other stakeholders.  
Research Methods 
In order to answer the question: how does fragmentation affect the reconstruction process and what are 
the causes of it, this study adopts an explanatory approach, based on a detailed longitudinal case study 
of the housing reconstruction program conducted after the earthquake that struck the city of Bam in Iran 
on December 26, 2003. Note that programs are considered here as a group of coordinated projects (PMI, 
2015). This research project borrows the concept of institutional fragmentation to explain how the 
reconstruction program was organized and managed by lead agencies, notably the National Disaster 
Task Force (NDTF) and the Housing Foundation of the Islamic Republic (HFIR), while taking into 
accouint the concept of time compression. Effects on time compression - assumed to be desirable - are 
also noted. 
 
In the first steps of the study, a detailed and extensive review of the project management and disaster 
management literature in general, and post-disaster housing reconstruction literature in particular, led to 
the formulation of a hypothetical proposition.	The predicted pattern in this research is that four common 
levels of fragmentation in regular construction projects (mentioned above) cause highly significant 
obstacles to collaboration and to knowledge- and experience-sharing in post-disaster reconstruction 
projects. The main proposition, in fact, is that lessons can be learned from a case that is relevant to 
other reconstruction projects in other contexts. In a second stage, empirical findings from the case of 
Bam were matched with the predicted patterns described above. The results were then validated, adding 
a nuance to the theoretical proposition and contributing to theory, or what Yin (2003, p. 33) describes 
as an “analytical generalization.” 
 
To validate the proposition, the transitional and permanent housing reconstruction phases within the 
overall reconstruction program were studied to explore what was particular about each of them, who 
was involved, in what order did stakeholders intervene, and what expertise and knowledge were 
provided by, and expected of, them, drawing on first-hand experience of professional participants. 
Qualitative and quantitative data were collected from different sources (see table 2) 
 
 
Table 2: The sources of information (qualitative and quantitative) 
Sources  Detail  Qualitative and quantitative data 
Interviews  
(Total 144 
interviews) 
Families  
(89 interviews) 
- Location, size, and quality of temporary houses  
- Location, size, and quality of houses before and after 
the disaster  
- Participation in housing reconstruction processes  
- Lifestyle and social connection before and after the 
disaster 
Officers and 
authorities  
(41 interviews)  
 
- Sheltering and housing reconstruction processes, 
involved stakeholders, and their roles  
- The structure of governance  
- Impediments to the collaboration between different 
stakeholders  
- Conflicts between stakeholders  
Local masons and 
general contractors 
(14 interviews)  
- Traditional construction technology and materials 
- Knowledge of disaster risk reduction requirements 
- Lessons learned from the reconstruction experience  
Documents  Policy documents  - Approvals of the cabinet of ministries 
- Approvals of the Reconstruction Supervision and 
Policymaking Association (RSPA) 
Meeting minutes - Minutes of the National Disaster Task Force’s  
(NDTF) meetings  
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- Minutes of the RSPA’s meetings in Bam  
- Minutes of the disaster management committee’s 
meetings in Kerman 
Executive reports  - The HFIR’s monthly reports of the housing projects 
(statistics on the number of reconstructed houses, 
involved stakeholders in every step of 
reconstruction, and the amount of given loan every 
month) 
The Bam 
Reconstruction 
Documentation 
Project (BRDP)  
 
- Temporary housing process,  
- Participatory approach in Bam reconstruction,  
- Project management in Bam reconstruction,  
- Resource management in Bam reconstruction,  
- Permanent housing process (planning and 
designing), and 
- Control and monitoring techniques, 
Field studies  
(11 field trips)  
 
1) July - August 2004, 2) February 2005, 3) February 2007), 4) February-
March 2008, 5) November 2008, 6) January 2011, 7) June-August 2011, 8) 
March 2012, 9) January-February 2013, 10) May-April 2013, and 11) June - 
July 2014 
 
Information about stakeholders, their roles in the reconstruction processes, their policies, decision-
making and implementation processes was collected through 144 interviews with key participants, 
including affected families, the HFIR’s key managers, heads of involved NGOs, heads of architectural 
consultancies, and local and regional representatives in the Islamic Parliament of Iran, at the time of the 
disaster.  
 
In order to follow the impact of variables in the short, mid and long-terms, data collection occurred 
during ten years and over the course of 11 field trips to Bam (see Table 2). In order to triangulate 
information obtained from direct sources, more than 32 reports and six policy documents were also 
analyzed. Documents included project meeting minutes, press releases and construction documents, and 
the 11 thematic reports of the Bam Reconstruction Documentation Project (BRDP) conducted by the 
Housing Foundation of Islamic Republic (HFIR). Reports and policy documents, findings from field 
visits, and direct observations helped us verify, contradict or corroborate information collected from the 
interviews. Data and methodological triangulation, according to Yin (2003, p. 98) helps to “converge 
lines of inquiry.” In fact, interviews, as a source of evidence, are often associated with personal 
interpretation and the distorted memories of interviewees. Likewise, incomplete and conflicting reports 
can also threaten the construct validity of the study. Triangulation of collected data and methods allowed 
us to create a coherent narrative of the events, decisions made, and actions in the reconstruction project 
over 10 years.  
Research Results 
First response after the 2003 earthquake in Bam 
The devastating earthquake that shook Bam in the early hours of the morning on 26 December 2003 
killed more than 22,400 people and injured more than 9,400. The population in the Bam area before the 
earthquake was 142,000 people. Thus it is estimated that one person in five died in the earthquake. In 
total there were about 75,000 people left homeless (Statistic Center of Iran, 2003). 
Since the 1962 earthquake in Bou’in-Zahra in Iran, various organizations at different scales and with 
various responsibilities have been appointed to manage post-disaster reconstruction programs. Having 
suffered from major disasters, such as the 1990 Manjil-Rudbar earthquake, Iran has developed an 
organizational system for post-disaster reconstruction, vested in the National Disaster Task Force 
(NDTF) and the Housing Foundation of Islamic Republic (HFIR). The NDTF was an internal 
organization of the Ministry of Interior Affairs, responsible for managing the chaotic conditions after a 
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disaster and for coordinating all reconstruction activities. The HFIR had long been recognized for being 
primarily responsible for providing affordable houses to low income families, and for post-disaster 
reconstruction. While there was no specific pre-disaster (operational) planning, there has been consistent 
learning from past experiences, and the establishment of principles underpinning reconstruction 
programs. 
The Bam earthquake, however, was the first large-scale urban earthquake in a historic city, drawing 
considerable national and international attention. Immediately after the disaster, the national 
government set up the Reconstruction Supervision and Policymaking Association (RSPA), an inter-
ministry organization headed by the Minister of Housing and Urban Development (MHUD) with 
extensive power only similar to the president’s cabinet (Fallahi, 2007; Fayazi, 2012; Fayazi & 
Lizarralde, 2014). The RSPA consisted of the Iranian vice president, nine ministers, the governor-
general of the Kerman province, and parliamentary representatives of Bam. It quickly appointed the 
HFIR as the sole housing reconstruction executor, arguing the long experience of the HFIR in low-cost 
housing and the provision of transitional and permanent shelters after disasters. To prevent the 
emergence of parallel organizations and excessive bureaucracy, the RSPA designated the HFIR to 
coordinate the relationship between contractors, banks, affected families, and the municipality (Babaie 
& Kabiri, 2011; Omidvar et al., 2010).   
In order to split the workload, authorities subdivided the affected areas – including the city of Bam, the 
suburban center of Baravat, and a few surrounding villages – between groups of officials at the deputy 
governor level. Initially, each group was responsible for managing the search and rescue operations 
immediately after the earthquake - a decision based on the group members’ general knowledge of the 
area, the extent of damage and the capacity of each rescue team. These same zones were subsequently 
used by the HFIR for organizing the removal of rubble and, more importantly, for reconstruction 
planning (Arefian, 2015). To cope with the extraordinary workload - from debris removal to 
reconstruction - the HFIR called on its provincial branches (the "Setads"). 
There were several principal stakeholders within the housing reconstruction project. All had decision-
making and supervisory roles at different levels or at different stages within the project. Before the 
reconstruction in Bam began, the RSPA formed the Bam Architectural and Urbanism Council (BAUC). 
Indeed, there was a need for a body to respond to pressure from the government and the professional 
bodies, as well as from the general public, to pay special attention to the architectural and urban qualities 
that Bam had been famous for. The BAUC was mandated to ensure that all activities in Bam were 
design-based and reflected the principle of safeguarding its urban fabric and cultural identity. The RSPA 
also identified the Kerman Construction Engineering Organization (KCEO) as the main entity 
responsible for providing continuous supervision over the actual construction, increasing retrofitting 
capabilities and avoiding any improper activities (Babaie & Kabiri, 2011).  
Thus, the RSPA, the HFIR, the BAUC and KCEO, plus a number of international, national and private 
companies and NGOs - each with their specific priorities - were all involved in participating in, or 
identifying and monitoring all the projects that had to be undertaken (see Figure 1).  
Figure 1 near here  
Transitional Sheltering Phase  
Prior to initiating the reconstruction program, the Iranian government appointed the National Disaster 
Task Force (NDTF), an internal organization of the Ministry of Interior Affairs, as the principal entity 
responsible for policymaking and executive operations regarding transitional sheltering. In the chaotic 
stages of emergency relief and transitional sheltering, the NDTF invited all possible organizations, 
private companies, and NGOs in the country to participate in providing shelters. Based on their logistic 
support and experience, the HFIR and the Defense Industry (dependent on the Ministry of Defense), as 
well as six more private companies, agreed to provide around 28,000 units (NDTF, 2004).          
The urgent need for settling survivors in safe shelters, facilitating distribution of aid and services, and 
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accelerating the debris removal program, led the NDTF to make rapid decisions. Within less than three 
months after the earthquake, it adopted policies of providing camps of transitional shelters inside and 
on the outskirts of the city (Fayazi, 2012). Unforeseen challenges, however, hindered the process of 
implementation and forced the participants to react accordingly. In fact, by the end of March 2004 (four 
months after the earthquake), suppliers could only provide 2,033 units (KDTF, 2004). Common 
challenges included distinguishing native Bam families from opportunistic immigrants, selecting 
appropriate materials and construction techniques, and reaching a fair distribution of units and services. 
Moreover, most of the families refused to move to the temporary camps and preferred to stay in 
emergency tents near their remaining assets, and far from the harsh conditions on the outskirts of the 
city (the camps were unsafe and occupied by a large number of immigrants who arrived in Bam in the 
hope of obtaining financial aid and services) (Fayazi & Lizarralde, 2014). In response, the HFIR, based 
on lessons learned from its previous experiences, suggested providing transitional shelters in the yards 
of destroyed houses (Joodi, 2011; Mahdian, 2010; NDTF, 2014).  
Although this decision addressed the majority of challenges and respected the families’ needs and 
desires, it had the immediate effect of breaking the work into short batches, requiring many short-run 
work packages and increasingly complex and time-consuming management, thus putting more financial 
pressure on the participating suppliers, forcing them to stay longer in Bam than they had anticipated, 
and forcing changes to their organizational structures. Because of their short time horizons, some 
participants could hardly accept the changes and continued providing shelters in the camps, while 
decreasing their commitments (KDTF, 2014). The HFIR then agreed to design and develop 7600 modest 
units using earthquake-resistant steel structures and masonry walls (see Figure 2). The units were 
planned to be used after the transitional sheltering phase alongside the permanently reconstructed houses 
(Ghafory-Ashtiany & Hosseini, 2008). 
The HFIR tackled the issues of higher costs and delays through: 1) involving families in the construction 
process; 2) establishing a distributed organizational structure in Bam, including 10 provincial branches 
(the Setads) and one specialized office in Tehran, and 3) assuring easy and unrestricted access to 
construction materials. Given the HFIR’s main role as the key executor in the reconstruction of 
permanent houses, providing masonry-built units in the yards of destroyed houses led it to articulate the 
transitional sheltering and permanent housing phases into a single continuous process. In fact, the 
inhabitants of these units started the permanent reconstruction phase faster than those who lived in the 
camps (Fayazi & Lizarralde, 2014).   
Ultimately, five of the six transitional shelter suppliers agreed to provide their committed transitional 
units in the yards of destroyed houses, but at increased costs and over a longer period of time. Although 
the prefabricated units permitted settling the families close to their remaining assets, they paid virtually 
no attention to the possibility that affected families participate in building the units. Furthermore, not 
only were these units made of low quality materials but also they could hardly be adapted to be used 
later alongside the permanently reconstructed houses.  
Figure 2 near here  
Studies conducted at the end of the longitudinal research show that the HFIR’s strategy led to long-term 
positive effects on the recovery of households, notably in the economic, social, environmental, and 
political dimensions (Fayazi & Lizarralde, 2014). Proximity to their community allowed the families to 
communicate with their pre-disaster neighbors, sharing their worries, and adapting quickly to the 
adverse conditions. Permanent housing reconstruction was also facilitated by the families’ participation 
and their close relationship with the responsible local organizations, all of which subsequently enhanced 
the levels of community satisfaction (Fayazi et al., 2015).  
However, the transitional sheltering experience in Bam reveals several problems. First, it exacerbated 
the existing social gaps between the home owners who had a chance to live in the yards of their destroyed 
houses, and those who were tenants before the disaster and who were forced to live in the camps for 
almost two years. Second, this approach created a dramatic difference between those who received 
masonry shelters and those who received the prefabricated ones. Third, it led to there being almost 3100 
unoccupied (wasted) units in the camps (KDTF, 2014). The institutional fragmentation in the transitional 
sheltering programs is shown in Table 3.  
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Permanent Housing Phase  
Given the particular condition of the disaster, and the lessons learnt from previous experiences, the 
RSPA established three underpinning objectives for permanent housing reconstruction in Bam: a) 
safeguarding its cultural identity and architectural fabric, b) constructing earthquake resistant buildings; 
and c) taking advantage of the participation of disaster-affected people. In order to do so, authorities 
adopted the owner-driven reconstruction approach (Barenstein, 2010) for mobilising disaster-affected 
people and developed guidelines for achieving the second and third objectives. The owner-driven 
reconstruction approach was successful in previous reconstruction programs, such as the Manjil 
reconstruction (Joodi, 2010). But beneficiaries would have to be supported during the reconstruction of 
their houses if the two other reconstruction objectives were to be achieved. The HFIR, as the executive 
body for reconstruction, invited a variety of organizations to provide financial, technical and 
administrative support to residents for permanent reconstruction, such as the MHUD, the BAUC, the 
KCEO, and the provincial branches of the HFIR as assistant organizations (the ‘Setads’, mentioned 
above). Architectural consultancies and contractors were also invited. At one stage, about 11 of the 
HFIR’s provincial branches, 44 architectural consultancies, and 211 contractor teams were appointed in 
Bam and Baravat to assist around 25,000 households in rebuilding their houses, in a process including 
design and construction phases (Babaie & Kabiri, 2011). Before the start of the program, preparations 
were made to ensure the smooth delivery of housing units, and thus, regular monthly meetings and two 
workshops were held to help on this. For example, prior to opening the program to beneficiaries, local 
consultancies, and the MHUD developed various housing typologies that could reflect different living 
conditions, while also taking national seismic regulations into account (Arefian, 2015). 
   
Working closely with beneficiaries and Setads, 28 number of architectural firms established local 
branches in Bam to help beneficiaries in the architectural, structural, mechanical, and electrical design 
of houses. These so-called "local consultancies" provided “free design and technical services” for the 
beneficiaries, but were in reality paid by the HFIR. Their services started when Setads and the 
municipality referred a beneficiary to them, and continued by preparing all required designs, site and 
technical plans, until the planning permission for the houses was granted and the construction activities 
could be started. They were not engaged in construction activities.  
In order to harmonize activities by these architectural consultancies, their work had to receive approval 
from two controllers. The first one was another architectural consultancy firm, referred to as the ‘Mother 
Consultancy’ (MC), which had to approve architectural designs to make sure they complied with 
BAUC’s architectural codes and recommendations. The second controller was the KCEO, which 
assured compliance with seismic regulations and building-related codes (Babaie & Kabiri, 2011; 
Saemian & Erfanian, 2011).  
However, real-time observations during the reconstruction period, from the perspective of an 
architectural consultancy who worked with 2,100 beneficiaries, and from later studies, revealed 
significant delays in the design stage and the ensuing frustration among beneficiaries, who were 
desperate to return to their houses (Arefian, 2015). The delays and frustrations mainly stemmed from a 
conflict between the MC and the KCEO that emerged early in the design phase, causing lengthy waiting 
times for the local consultancies to obtain the required stamps of approval from both controllers while 
coping with the beneficiaries’ expectations to start the construction phase as soon as possible (Arefian, 
2015, 2016). This became a major problem, given the importance that was given by the government to 
rapid solutions (Meskinazarian, 2011; Saemian & Erfanian, 2011). 
The source of this conflict lay in the fact that, at an early stage during reconstruction, the KCEO imposed 
further technical restrictions to the existing national seismic regulations, to be applied in the Bam area. 
This was done without liaising with other reconstruction participants. As a result, architectural designs 
under the BAUC’s initial architectural guidance and approval by the MC, could not receive approval 
from the KCEO and vice versa (Arefian, 2015, 2016). As was documented later, the HFIR tried to tackle 
the problems, but even mediations by the HFIR were not successful  (Saemian & Erfanian, 2011). One 
of the solutions which ended this conflict and removed this bottleneck was that the MC, finally and 
reluctantly, accepted the newly introduced KCEO’s restrictions (Arefian, 2015, 2016). Nonetheless, this 
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conflict had a major influence on how housing reconstruction worked from then on. Figure 3 shows a 
typical example of a fully completed house as approved by the controllers. Thus, the housing 
reconstruction program ended up in the production of simple rectangular houses. Although these houses 
still followed a few basic architectural guidance rules, e.g. by preserving the palm trees and using local 
materials, the completed houses were far from the initial ideas envisioned by the BAUC, based on 
traditional architecture in Bam (Arefian, 2016).  
Figure 3 near here  
 
Later studies linked the emergence of this major conflict (i) to the number of participants in the housing 
reconstruction, (ii) to treating program objectives in isolation, (iii) to the failure in identifying and 
harmonizing functional interconnections (Arefian, 2016), and (iv) to a lack of mutual understanding of 
priorities (Arefian, 2015). All this is an elaborated, but unfortunately typical example of institutional 
fragmentation that characterized the permanent housing experience in Bam. See more in Table 3.   
Table 3: Fragmentation in the transitional sheltering and the permanent housing programs in Bam 
Fragmentation 
type  
Fragmentation in the Transitional 
Sheltering Program 
Fragmentation in the Permanent 
Housing Reconstruction Programme 
Construction 
Industry 
Fragmentation 
Competition on the number, time, and cost 
of units.  
Conflict and confrontation between two 
controller organisations (MC & KCEO) 
The existence of different experts in low-
cost housing, Defense Industry, pre-
fabricated unit designers and developers. 
The existence of too many organizations 
for undertaking technical, financial and 
administrative tasks 
Procurement 
Fragmentation 
Invitation of organizations, companies, and 
NGOs to provide shelters fast and low-
priced.  
Separate design and construction phases  
 
An instance of Defense Industry and one 
private company on the provision of camps 
of pre-fabricated units rather than separated 
units in the yards.  
Numerous small contractor teams 
The existence of a weak link between the 
HFIR, as an experienced contractor, and the 
other contractors who had no particular 
experience in the reconstruction.    
Lack of contact between consultancies and 
contractor teams,  
Design Project 
Fragmentation 
The fragmented design of pre-fabricated 
units, camps, and isolated units located in the 
yards, corresponding to a change in project 
briefs. 
Sequential approach to design and 
construction phases 
Construction 
work 
fragmentation 
Despite previous experience, there was a 
change in policy regarding the types and 
locations of transitional housing half way 
through the program, thus leading to a break 
down of planned production work. 
Difficulty in planning and managing the 
construction processes after the delays in 
the approval stages. Lack of a responsible 
supervising architect familiar with the 
designs. 
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Taken together, the results shown in Table 3 highlight the extremely negative consequences of deviating 
from an established plan. These consequences cascade from one level to the next, where it becomes 
increasingly difficult to carry out any effective corrective measures. Of course, in the circumstances that 
prevail after a disaster, it is only to be expected that there be changes; the lesson is that plans - 
particularly those established in anticipation of a possible disaster - should include a management 
strategy that allows for uncertainty and consequent variations in time and place. 
Mid-term and long-term impacts of the reconstruction program 
The theoretical concepts associated with institutional fragmentation in construction can be 
systematically applied to the individual phases of a reconstruction program such as the provision of 
transitional sheltering and permanent housing, as we have shown. However, one has to ask what happens 
at the end of the "official" reconstruction program, when the organizations that had been put in place 
with their skills and know-how, withdrew or were closed, bearing in mind that "recovery is a complex 
process with an ill-defined endpoint and no agreed upon measure of success" (Rubin, 1985, cited by 
Johnson and Hayashi 2012, p. 215).	 Is there then a transition to a state of normality, in which 
construction continues "as usual", that is to say as prior to the earthquake with its endemic 
fragmentation? This issue is important in a project management perspective, where projects have 
determined beginnings and ends, and are devised to attain set objectives. In reconstruction, stakeholders 
deal with programs (groups of coordinated projects), the endpoints of which are not necessarily well 
established. What happens afterwards is a question which somewhat naturally falls outside the scope of 
conventional project management and conventional views of institutional fragmentation.  
Looking at the reconstruction program of Bam at first, it appeared that all the new houses that were 
being built during the reconstruction phase were rigorously complying with the seismic building codes 
and one could therefore assume that they would withstand earthquakes - if only because of the HFIR-
appointed inspectors’ work.  But the biggest challenge turned out to be the long term continuity of 
building with earthquake-resistance and the concomitant understanding by all implicated builders of 
how to so.  
The seismic building codes were severely enforced by continuous inspections from KCEO during the 
reconstruction period; however, a driving force for subsequently maintaining the appropriate 
implementation remained unaddressed. How could it be ensured that contractors would maintain the 
proper practice of implementation when the rigorous external controls are removed? How can the 
continuity of earthquake-safe building knowledge be maintained in a context such as Bam? 
Careful observations from within contractor firms, and by field studies and interviews over a longer 
period after the official end of the reconstruction program, show that the builders received a considerable 
degree of information about safe construction, but the practice of safe-construction lacked meaning for 
them. They knew which components were important for reinforcing the structure against seismic shocks, 
but they did not necessarily understand what were the underlying principles for using those components. 
As a result, structures were overdone, under the misconception that the bigger the structural elements, 
the stronger the building (see Figure 4) and over-sizing concrete reinforcing was a very common practice 
in the popular housing sector. In other words, although it seemed that the local masons and general 
contractors knew what measures to take to build in anticipation of earthquakes, they did not appear to 
comprehend the concepts behind these principles. 
Figure 4 near here  
 
This situation clearly demonstrated the well-known distinction between "knowing" and "knowledge". 
Once again, new techniques were put into practice within the community of builders without knowing 
sufficiently why they were doing what they were doing, but unlike the situation that prevailed before 
the earthquake when insufficient and improper techniques were used, now they used more than 
sufficient technical features, but improperly and wastefully. Although the local builders’ understanding 
of the earthquake-resistant construction (what to do) was present, the reconstruction program failed to 
transfer the knowledge of earthquake-resistant construction (why and how to do it).  
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Discussion and Conclusions  
The reconstruction of Bam took place in an environment that was expected to be conducive to 
collaboration between participants. The reconstruction program also shows how the HFIR benefited 
from its accumulated experience as a longer-term intervener, thus leading to a higher chance of success 
and to the creation of better solutions. In fact, accumulated experience vested in the lead agency (HFIR), 
feedback from previous reconstruction programs, and the backing of a central government willing to 
become involved, combined to establish a framework within which administrators, professionals and 
enterprises should be able to work in harmony. Observations show, however, how in spite of policies, 
institutional fragmentation after the disaster hindered collaboration between participants in two different 
phases. The endemic construction-related institutional fragmentation could not be easily brushed aside. 
For example, the administrative agencies had difficulty in agreeing on common principles and applying 
them in a coordinated fashion; as a result, the professionals, as reported, had to cope with changes to the 
ground rules in a situation that was already - by its very nature - fraught with complexities.  
Some implications in practice and theory can be drawn from studying the reconstruction experience in 
Bam. First, empirical findings show that there is a significant difference between the publicly shared 
vision of a national effort to reconstruct in the context of a historic site, and the realities of arranging for 
construction work to be done in the field rapidly, whether by professionals or enterprises. This difference 
is reflected in the contractual arrangements that are established between the parties - at the level of the 
reconstruction program as a whole and at the level of the individual projects that make it up. These are 
the contracts that define who does what and under what conditions; together they form the procurement 
system. 
Second, results reveal that the specific conditions after disasters such as the scale of projects, emphasis 
on time, emphasis on reducing future disaster risks, and socio-political pressures make institutional 
fragmentation highly inevitable in post-disaster reconstruction projects. For instance, the emphasis on 
providing transitional shelters during the shortest time possible after the disaster in Bam required 
inviting a large number of construction unit designers and developers with distinct capacity and 
experience levels. In order to ensure the provision of required units on schedule, the government 
intensified the competition on the number, time, and cost of units, causing construction industry and 
procurement fragmentation during the transitional sheltering phase. Similarly, socio-political pressures 
along with the emphasis on reducing future disaster risks led to conflict and confrontation between two 
controller organizations (MC and KCEO) during the permanent housing phase. Again, the emphasis on 
time separated design and construction phases, involved numerous small contractor teams, and broke 
off contact between consultancies and contractor teams.  
This research explains three out of four different levels of fragmentation in post-disaster reconstruction 
in Bam, including: construction industry fragmentation, traditional procurement fragmentation, and 
design project fragmentation. However, the findings have to be taken with prudence. This study suffered 
from several limitations, including difficulty accessing key participants, and scarce information about 
the involved NGOs. However, one of the most important limits of this study is that the regular 
construction projects in Iran were not examined, and results cannot explain how the institutional 
fragmentation that was found in this reconstruction program compares with regular construction projects 
in Iran. Construction work fragmentation, even though it is included in our conclusions, should be 
regarded as tentative; in any case it is strongly influenced by procurement fragmentation. Indeed, further 
studies need to be conducted to compare institutional fragmentation between regular and post-disaster 
construction projects in a similar context.  
This study explores leading causes of the absence of collaboration and the lack of the sharing of 
knowledge and experience in post-disaster reconstruction. It examines the reconstruction project after 
the 2003 earthquake in Bam, Iran, and explains how fragmentation appeared in Bam. Results show how 
these levels of fragmentation led to the reported outcomes, which were very different from the publicly 
shared vision of the reconstruction program. Conflict and confrontation between two controller 
organizations (MC and KCEO) ended in the excessive emphasis on technical requirements at the 
expense of designs aimed at respecting and preserving the cultural heritage, as reported regarding the 
permanent housing program. Findings also point to specific conditions that prevail after disasters - such 
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as time and socio-political pressures, and the involvement of numerous stakeholders with different 
interests and expectations - all of which increase the effects of fragmentation, however endemic, and 
lead to consequences on the ability to manage the compression of time. 
In traditional circumstances, institutional fragmentation in the construction sector is circumvented by 
the fact that everyone knows that everyone knows what they are supposed to be doing. In reconstruction, 
however, this is almost inevitably not the case if only because of the number and variety of participants, 
and it is clear that in such a context, procurement must be systematic, inclusive and comprehensive, 
covering not only expectations about each participant's tasks, but also about the interfaces - both 
hierarchical and transversal - that will enable those tasks to be conducted effectively.   
Examining the different phases of the Bam case (including the post-program phase) shows that many 
aspects of project-related work were improvised in response to events that could, or should have been 
anticipated. That these events can be attributed to fragmentation does not relieve everyone's 
responsibility to ensure (i) commonly accepted definitions of tasks, (ii) advance identification of 
interfaces and (iii) proportioned recognition of each participant's knowledge requirements. Instead, there 
is a need for a clear all-embracing organizational structure, termed "meta-procurement" by Johnson et 
al. (2005). Successful reconstruction of Bam - and elsewhere - must pass through this meta-procurement 
filter.			
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Figure 1: Stakeholders involved in the Bam reconstruction program 
 
 
  	
Figure 2: Camps of prefabricated units provided by Defence Industry (Left); units made of steel frames 
and masonry walls in the yards of destroyed houses, the HFIR’s solution (Center); prefabricated units 
provided in the yards of destroyed houses by one of the private companies (Right). (photos by Fayazi)  		
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Figure 3 : A typical example of a reconstructed house, lacking the architectural qualities that 
characterised historic architecture in Bam. (photo by Arefian) 			
  	
Figure 4: Improper use of reinforcement illustrates the presence of a blind application of safe-
construction knowledge (photos by Gharaati) 					
